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COMMENT
Comment: Blinking at Reality: An
Examination of Bray v. Alexandria
By MARJORiE RICHTER*
[W]hile racial criteria presumptively reflect invidious prejudice-
and thus unequal protection-gender distinctions are in many
ways part of the essential fabric of society. Unthinkingly to equate
racial categories with gender categories for purposes of federal stat-
utory or constitutional guarantees of civil rights is to blink at
reality. 1
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the goal of preventing abor-
tion, that goal in itself... does not remotely qualify for... deroga-
tory association with racism. To the contrary, we have said that "a
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion" is proper and
reasonable .... I
In enacting a law such as § 1985(3) for federal courts to enforce,
Congress asked us to see through the excuses-the "rational" mo-
tives-that will always disguise discrimination. Congress asked us
to foresee, and speed, the day when such discrimination, no matter
how well disguised, would be unmasked.3
Introduction
The Supreme Court remains ambivalent about abortion. On the one
hand, the 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey4 upheld Roe v. Wade' and said that the right to abortion
was, indeed, protected by the Constitution. On the other hand, Casey
* Member, Class of 1993; M.A. 1991, San Francisco State; B.A. 1983, U.C. Berkeley.
Thanks to Cynthia Bryant, Ted Franklin, Michelene Insalaco, and Joanne Spalding for their
encouragement and astute editing and to Professor Mary Dunlap for her helpful comments on
an early draft.
1. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 5, Bray v. Alexandria, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985),
available in LEXIS, GENFED library, BRIEFS file [hereinafter Petitioners' Reply Brief].
2. Bray v. Alexandria, 113 S. Ct. 753, 762 (1993) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
474 (1977)).
3. Id. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
4. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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allowed new restrictions.6 In January 1993, the Court had an opportu-
nity to examine the abortion issue from a different perspective. Bray v.
Alexandria7 posed the question of whether 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)8 provides
federal protection to clinics against anti-abortion protesters who block-
ade them.9 The Court held that it does not.
Anti-abortion protesters have significantly impaired the ability of
women to obtain abortions."° Thus while Bray, unlike Casey, did not
endorse new government restrictions on the right to abortion, the effect
of Bray may be to make abortions harder to obtain.
When he heard about the Bray decision, Randall Terry, the head of
Operation Rescue, said: "God be praised. The most potent weapon the
child killers had against us was the illegal use of the federal judiciary.
That weapon was... smashed to pieces. This is really going to help us in
our recruiting. Look out, here we come.""
Federal legislators, however, immediately made plans to introduce
legislation that would provide federal protection to the clinics. On the
day of the Bray decision, Rep. Charles E. Schumer, D-N.Y., chairman of
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, said he would
sponsor legislation to ensure that "the right to choose is a meaningful not
just a technical" constitutional right. I"
The March 10, 1993 murder of Dr. David Gunn outside a Pensa-
cola, Florida medical clinic underscored the urgency of the problem.
The next day, within minutes after being confirmed by the Senate, Attor-
ney General Janet Reno denounced the murder as "horrible" and said
she would explore whether federal laws could be immediately invoked to
prevent such violence. 3 Justice Department officials, however, found
that the Bray decision effectively precluded any such immediate action,
6. The Court found the following requirements constitutional: a 24-hour waiting period,
parental consent for minors, and the requirement that names and addresses of abortion recipi-
ents be reported to the state. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
7. 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
8. Section 1983 is a Reconstruction era civil rights statute that created a federal cause of
action for people who are targets of a conspiracy to deprive them of equal protection of the
laws or to hinder officials from securing equal protection. See discussion infra part I.B.
9. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 753.
10. See discussion infra part I.A.
11. Dick Lehr, Court Limits Protection From Abortion Protests; Rules Civil Rights Law
Does Not Apply, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1993, Metro/Region Section, at 1.
12. Marcia Coyle & Cris Carmody, Hill Leaders Plan to Seek "Klan Law" Reversal,
NAT'L L.J., Jan. 25, 1993, at 5. The bill, known as the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances
Act, was subsequently introduced, and as of mid-June 1993, awaited further action in the
House. The Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee approved a similar bill on June
23, 1993, and sent it to the full Senate. Senate Panel OKs Bill to Bar Blockades of Abortion
Clinics, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1993, at A5.
13. Michael Isikoff, Administration Will Attempt to Make Obstructing Abortion Clinics a
Felony, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1993, at A13.
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including ordering the use of U.S. Marshals to guard the clinics.14 In-
stead, the Justice Department reportedly pushed to toughen the pending
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, seeking to bar any interfer-
ence with or threats to doctors or other medical personnel and to impose
harsher penalties, including criminal sanctions of up to twenty years in
prison.15 Anti-abortion advocates claimed the proposed Act was uncon-
stitutional and vowed an immediate legal challenge if it passed.16
The controversy this issue has generated is apparent in the Bray de-
cision itself. As was true in Casey, the various opinions in Bray show
striking disagreement among the Justices. There were five opinions: the
opinion of the Court, written by Scalia and joined by Rehnquist, White,
Kennedy, and Thomas; a concurrence by Kennedy; a dissent by Stevens
joined by Blackmun; a dissent by O'Connor, also joined by Blackmun;
and an opinion written by Souter concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part. Not only did the Justices differ as to what the proper
outcome should be, but they also fundamentally disagreed about how to
frame the issues of the case. Even more striking, the Justices did not
agree on what issues were properly before the Court. Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Blackmun, and Souter would have decided the case on the
basis of an issue that the majority held was not before them because it
had not been properly raised.17 Overall, the tone of the opinions was
acrimonious. The majority opinion, for example, attacked the dissents in
twelve footnotes, some quite lengthy.
The importance of Bray goes beyond its holding. By emphasizing
that "a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion is proper and
reasonable,"18 the Court provided one more precedent on which it may
rely to further weaken the right to abortion. By distinguishing abortion
seekers from women in general, the Court ignored the reality that only
women have abortions, and it created a new legal fiction that can only
obscure the truth.
The Court did not go quite as far as Operation Rescue urged. It did
not distinguish racial from gender discrimination by claiming, as Opera-
tion Rescue did, that gender distinctions were "part of the essential
14. Id. This would certainly seem to undermine Justice Kennedy's argument that
§ 1985(3) was unnecessary to protect clinics and their patients because "[i]n the event of a law
enforcement emergency as to which State and local resources are inadequate... the Attorney
General is empowered to put the full range of federal law enforcement resources at the disposal
of the State, including the resources of the United States Marshals service." Bray, 113 S. Ct. at
769 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15. Isikoff, supra note 13, at A13. Attorney General Reno said: "We have concluded
that passage of this legislation is a priority, it is important, and we're going to work with
Congress in every way to secure passage." Id.
16. Id.
17. See infra parts I.F.4 and III.B.
18. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
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fabric of society."19 But the Court did make two unfortunate distinc-
tions. First, it explicitly stated that "the goal of preventing abortion...
does not remotely qualify for... derogatory association with racism."20
Second, it expressly declined to decide whether the statute could apply to
discrimination based on anything other than race.21 Thus, the Court re-
fused to apply the ideals embedded in the statute to what, in Justice
O'Connor's words, was a "modem-day paradigm of the situation the
statute was meant to address."
22
Discrimination takes many forms. By refusing to "see through the
excuses-the 'rational' motives-that will always disguise discrimina-
tion,"'23 it was the Court, not those seeking to end discrimination, that
was blinking at reality.
Part I of this Comment discusses the background of the case: the
anti-abortion protests; the statutory and case law history of § 1985(3);
sex discrimination, the right to travel, and the right to abortion doctrine;
the 1985(3) case law in the abortion clinic blockade context; and the
facts, procedural history, and lower court decisions in Bray. Part II
briefly summarizes the various Bray opinions. Part III presents an analy-




Operation Rescue and other anti-abortion protesters have staged
many of what they term "rescues" in the past few years. The protesters'
immediate goal is to disrupt abortion clinic operations. Their ultimate
goal is to shut the clinics down.24 The conflict between the demonstra-
tors and those seeking to enter the clinics has often ended up in the fed-
eral courts.25
19. Petitioners' Reply Brief at 5.
20. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
21. Id. at 759.
22. Id. at 805 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va. 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d
582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria, 113 S. Ct. 753
(1993).
25. See Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 954 F.2d 624 (11th Cir. 1992); Vol-
unteer Medical Clinic v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991); New York State
NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Roe v. Abor-
tion Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); Northern
Va. Women's Medical Ctr. v. Balch, 617 F.2d 1045 (4th Cir. 1980); Women's Health Care
Services v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773 F. Supp. 258 (Kan. 1991); Planned Parenthood Ass'n
of San Mateo County v. Holy Angels Catholic Church, 765 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1991);
Lucero v. Operation Rescue of Birmingham, 772 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Ala. 1991), aff'd, 954
F.2d 624 (1lth Cir. 1992); NOW v. Operation Rescue, 747 F. Supp. 760 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd
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Operation Rescue defined "rescues" in its literature as "physically
blocking abortion mills with [human] bodies, to intervene between abor-
tionists and the innocent victims."26 Randall Terry, Operation Rescue's
founder and National Director, described it this way: "[W]hile the child-
killing facility is blockaded, no one is permitted to enter past the rescuers
.... Doctors, nurses, patients, staff, abortion-bound women, families of
abortion-bound women-all are prevented from entering the abortuary
while the rescue is in progress."27
"Rescue" demonstrations have been carried out nationwide. Often,
the demonstrators greatly outnumber the local police.2" The threat
posed by anti-abortion protesters is hardly trivial. For example, a protest
group's intimidation of doctors in North Dakota was so effective that by
February 1992, there was only one clinic left in the state that would still
perform abortions.29
The violence has been escalating. The National Abortion Federa-
tion, which represents 200 clinics, said that reported vandalism more
than doubled from 1991 to 1992, and cases of arson rose from four in
1990 to twelve last year.30 In April 1993, the fire-bombing of a clinic in
Corpus Christi, Texas destroyed a building and caused $1 million in
damages.3' In March 1993, four health care workers were hospitalized
when a chemical was sprayed into eight California clinics in Riverside
and San Diego counties.32
On March 10, 1993, Dr. David Gunn was shot to death during an
anti-abortion protest outside a Pensacola, Florida clinic. Michael Grif-
fin, an anti-abortion protestor who apparently was not an active member
914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria, 113 S.
Ct. 753 (1993); Southwestern Medical Clinics v. Operation Rescue, 744 F. Supp. 230 (D. Nev.
1989); Cousins v. Terry, 721 F. Supp. 426 (N.D.N.Y. 1989); National Abortion Fed'n v. Oper-
ation Rescue, 721 F. Supp. 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1989); New York State NOW v. Terry, 704 F.
Supp. 1247 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), afl'd, 919 F.2d 1339, 1359 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S.
947 (1990); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577 (E.D. Pa. 1989), affid in part, rev'd in
part, 919 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1990); NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va.
1989), affid, 914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub. nom. Bray v.
Alexandria, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993); Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d
788 (5th Cir. 1989); Portland Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, 712 F.
Supp. 165 (D. Or. 1988), afl'd, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988); New York State NOW v. Terry,
697 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. N.Y. 1988); Northeast Women's Ctr. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp.
1147 (E.D. Pa. 1987), affid in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989).
26. NOWv. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1488 (quoting OPERATION RESCUE - NA-
TIONAL DAY OF RESCUE-Oct. 29, 1988).
27. Id. (quoting Terry's affidavit).
28. See infra part I.F.l.a.
29. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Feb. 2, 1992).
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of any organized group, shot Dr. Gunn three times in the back.33 Anti-
abortion activists generally condemned the killing, but some donated
money to a legal defense fund for Griffin.34
Although Randall Terry called the killing an "inappropriate, repul-
sive act," he also described Dr. Gunn as a murderer of babies.3" A year
earlier, Terry had distributed "Wanted" ffiers targeting Dr. Gunn that
gave the doctor's itinerary, and said "We Need Your Help to Stop David
Gunn .... REWARD: Babies' Lives Will be Saved if He Stops!!fll"36 A
few days before the killing, Terry had said at a Melbourne, Florida rally
that "[t]he weak link is the doctor .... We're going to expose them.
We're going to humiliate them."37
Thus, while most anti-abortion activists condemned the killing,3" it
is clear that their confrontational tactics helped create the conditions in
which such a murder could occur.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
39
§ 1985(3) is a civil rights law that provides injured parties, or parties
deprived of their constitutional rights, a federal cause of action against
persons conspiring to deprive them of the equal protection of the laws, or
against persons conspiring to hinder officials from securing to all persons
the equal protection of the laws. Bray was the first case where the
33. Id.




37. Rohter, supra note 30, at 1.
38. Some of the more radical groups, however, said they would "not mourn the death of a
doctor who performed abortions." Id.
39. The full text of the section is as follows:
If one or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the
highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of
the equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or
securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the
laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat,
any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a
legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an
elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United
States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support of
advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of
having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1980).
Supreme Court considered the statute in the context of abortion
blockades.
The Bray Court treated the statute as if it were comprised of two
discrete clauses, and held that the first, but not the second, was properly
before the Court. The first clause, which the Court called the "depriva-
tion clause"'  prohibits conspiracies to deprive "any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws." The second, which the Court called the
"hindrance clause,"41 covers conspiracies "for the purpose of preventing
or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from
giving or securing to all persons within each State or Territory the equal
protection of the laws."
Bray was the first case where the Court considered a hindrance
clause claim. Some of the lower court abortion blockade decisions, how-
ever, relied on the "preventing or hindering" language without treating
the language as necessarily being part of a separate and distinct clause.4 2
1. Statutory History
43
The statute now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) was originally en-
acted as part of section 2 of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act.44 The 1871 Act
was one of several Congressional reactions to violence in the Reconstruc-
tion South,45 and was one of the first statutes passed pursuant to the
Enforcement Clause46 of the Fourteenth Amendment.47 When the 1871
Act was originally enacted, section 2 had both a criminal and a civil
component.48
The Act was intended to protect targets of Klan violence. Blacks
were the major, but not the exclusive, target. The Klan also attacked
white supporters of blacks, Republicans, northerners who had come
40. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 765.
41. Id. at 764.
42. See infra part I.E.
43. For a thorough discussion of the statutory history, see Rudolph M. Scott-
McLaughlin, Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: The Supreme Court's Next
Opportunity to Unsettle Civil Rights Law, 66 TUL. L. Rlv. 1357 (1992).
44. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1239 (3d Cir. 1978),
vacated, 442 U.S. 336 (1978).
The complete text of section 2 of the 1871 Act is reprinted id. at 1262-63.
The Bray opinions refer to the Act as the "Ku Klux Act." Most other sources refer to it
as the "Ku Klux Klan Act."
45. Id. at 1239.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 5. ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.")
47. Devin S. Schindler, Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3): A Limiting Strategy Gone Awry?, 83 MICH. L. Rv. 88, 88 n.3 (1985).
48. Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 43, at 1380-81 n.71. In 1874, the criminal provisions
were codified as § 5519 and the civil counterpart as § 1980 of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74.
Id. In 1979, the civil provision was given its current designation of § 1985(3). Id. at 1381.
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south after the war, native southerners who supported Reconstruction
policies, and government officials.49 According to at least one commen-
tator, the Act was designed to protect all classes of citizens targeted by
the Klan or other organizations; no supporter of the Act indicated any
intention to limit the statute's application to conspiracies motivated by
racial animus5 0 Senator Edmunds, who managed the bill on the Senate
floor said, in what has become a phrase often quoted in arguments that
the Act should be broadly interpreted, that if there were a conspiracy
against a person "because he was a Democrat, if you please, or because
he was a Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a
Vermonter... then this section could reach it."51
Concerns that section 2 of the 1871 Act might exceed Congress's
power under the Fourteenth Amendment by extending into areas tradi-
tionally reserved to the states prompted the House to amend the original
bill. 2 The main restriction placed on the statute's scope was the require-
ment that actionable conspiracies be motivated by a purpose to deny
equal protection of the laws. 3
2. The Supreme Court's Construction of § 1985(3)
a. Harris and Baldwin
Eleven years after the 1871 Act was enacted, the Court, in United
States v. Harris,4 declared that the criminal counterpart"5 to § 1985(3)
was unconstitutional. The Court found that the statute exceeded Con-
gress's power to enact legislation under the Thirteenth Amendment 6 be-
cause its reach went beyond protecting former slaves.5 The Court also
held that the statute exceeded Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it prohibited private actions.58
In 1887, the Court reaffirmed Harris in Baldwin v. Franks.59 After
the Harris and Baldwin decisions, § 1985(3) remained largely unused for
49. Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 43, at 1364.
50. Id.
51. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 773 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Senator Edmunds, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871)). Justice O'Connor also
quoted the phrase in her opinion. Id. at 800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 772 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Mark Fockle,
Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 402, 417 (1979)).
53. Id.
54. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
55. § 5519 of the Revised Statutes of 1873-74.
56. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
57. Harris, 106 U.S. at 641.
58. Id. at 639.
59. 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
seventy years.6
b. Collins
In 1951, the Court restricted the civil statute's scope in Collins v.
Hardyman6 I by holding that it protected only against state actions. 2
Collins involved a group of individuals who conspired for the purpose of
preventing a political club from meeting to adopt a resolution opposed to
the Marshall Plan.6 3 The majority held that the statute exceeded Con-
gress's Fourteenth Amendment powers.64 The dissent argued that Con-
gress had the power, separate and apart from the Fourteenth




In 1971, the Court in Griffin v. Breckenridge,66 while not explicitly
overruling Collins,67 held that § 1985(3) did apply to private conspira-
cies. In Grifflin, three black plaintiffs alleged that while they were travel-
ing on a public highway, a group of whites attacked them in the mistaken
belief that the blacks were civil rights workers.68 There was no claim
that the attack involved any action by state officials or that defendants
even pretended to act under color of state law. 69 Nevertheless, the Court
held that the complaint stated a cause of action under the statute.70
The Court noted that "in the light of the evolution of decisional
law, "71 many of the constitutional problems the Collins Court had faced
no longer existed, and that "[1]ittle reason remains, therefore, not to ac-
cord the words of the statute their apparent meaning."'72 The Court dis-
60. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1239 (3d Cir. 1978),
vacated, 442 U.S. 336 (1978).
61. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
62. Id. at 661-62.
63. Id. at 653-54.
64. Id. at 658. The Court stated that "since the decision... in the Civil Rights Cases, the
principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that.., the [Fourteenth]
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful." Id. (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
65. Id. at 664 (Burton, J., dissenting).
66. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
67. The Court in Griffin stated that Collins had been decided based on statutory construc-
tion rather than on constitutional grounds. Id. at 99. For a discussion of this point, see Scott-
McLaughlin, supra note 43, at 1386 n.101.
68. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 89-92.
69. Id. at 88.
70. Id. at 107.
71. Id. at 96.
72. Id.
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cussed judicial construction of related laws, the structural setting of the
statute, and the legislative history,73 and concluded that "as applied to
this complaint, we have no doubt" that the enactment of the statute was
within Congress's constitutional power.74
The Court also noted that the similar language in the statute and the
Fourteenth Amendment did not mean that the statute must be bound by
the Amendment's limitations. Although Fourteenth Amendment juris-
prudence made it difficult to imagine "equal protection" in a private
party context, the Court noted that there was nothing inherent in the
phrase itself that would limit it to state action.75
(2) The Animus Clause
Despite its holding that the statute reached private actions, the
Court was concerned about the statute's breadth:
That the statute was meant to reach private action does not, how-
ever, mean that it was intended to apply to all tortious, conspirato-
rial interferences with the rights of others.... The constitutional
shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a gen-
eral federal tort law can be avoided by giving full effect to the con-
gressional purpose-by requiring, as an element of the cause of
action, the kind of invidiously discriminatory motivation stressed
by the sponsors of the limiting amendment .... The language
requiring equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities,
means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators'
action.76
The requirement of "class-based, invidiously discriminatory ani-
mus" became a key element in the Bray majority's rationale for denying
the clinics' claims of protection under the statute. The phrase "racial, or
perhaps otherwise" also became important in subsequent litigation. The
Griffin Court itself was careful to note that it was leaving the class-based
issue open: "We need not decide, given the facts of this case, whether a
conspiracy motivated by invidiously discriminatory intent other than ra-
73. The Court cited various statements made in the 42 congressional debates, including
the following: "[T]he United States always has assumed to enforce, as against the States, and
also persons, every one of the provisions of the Constitution." Id. at 100 (citing Representative
Shellabarger (the House's sponsor of the bill), CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong, 1st Sess., 68 (1871))
(emphasis supplied by Griffn); "I do not want to see [this measure] so amended that there
shall be taken out of it the frank assertion of the power of the national Government to protect
life, liberty, and property, irrespective of the act of the State." Id. at 101 (citing Representative
Shanks, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1871)); and "Congress must deal with indi-
viduals, not States. It must punish the offender against the rights of the citizen." Id. (citing
Senator Pool, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. Ist Sess. 608 (1871)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 97.
76. Id. at 102.
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cial bias would be actionable under the portion of § 1985(3) before US."
77
d. Carpenters
In 1983, the Court in United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
v. Scott (hereinafter Carpenters)7" voted 5-479 to place further restrictions
on § 1985(3). The majority stated that the statute itself provided no sub-
stantive rights to plaintiffs, and that the protected rights, privileges, and
immunities must therefore be found elsewhere.8 0 The Court held that a
conspiracy against non-union workers and more generally, conspiracies
motivated by economic bias, were not covered by § 1985(3)."1
Once again, the majority of the Court refused to decide the broader
question of whether the section covered any non-racial discrimination. 2
Although the Carpenters majority admitted that the question was
"close"8 3 and that there was "some legislative history to support the view
that § 1985(3) has a broader reach,"'8 4 they ultimately decided simply
"not [to] a " the notion that the statute's reach should extend beyond
racial discrimination.85
Most important in terms of the Bray majority's use of Carpenters as
precedent was the finding in Carpenters that a showing of state action
was a necessary part of a § 1985(3) claim.86 The state action requirement
had not been present in Griffin. On the contrary, the Griffin Court stated
that "on their face, the words of the statute fully encompass the conduct
of private persons. "87 Furthermore, the Griffin Court argued that the
broad judicial interpretation of Reconstruction civil rights statutes in
general and the criminal analogue of § 1985(3) in particular;88 compan-
ion statutory provisions that did explicitly mention state action;89 and the
legislative history90 all "point[ed] unwaveringly" 91 at § 1985(3)'s cover-
77. Id. at 102 n.9. The Court stated that "since the allegations of the complaint bring this
cause of action so close to the constitutionally authorized core of the statute, there has been no
occasion here to trace out its constitutionally permissible periphery." Id. at 107.
78. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
79. Justices Burger, White, Powell, Stevens, and Rehnquist were in the majority; Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor dissented.
80. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833.
81. Id. at 838.
82. Id. at 835.
83. Id. at 836.
84. Id.
85. Id at 835.
86. Specifically, the Court said that if plaintiffs base a § 1985(3) claim on a right protected
only against official conduct, they must prove "that the state was somehow involved in or
affected by the conspiracy." Id at 833.
87. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96 (1971).
88. Id. at 97-98.
89. Id. at 98-99.
90. Id. at 99-101.
91. Id. at 101.
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age of purely private conspiracies.
In order to harmonize their decision with Griffin, the Carpenters
majority emphasized that Griffin had been decided on the basis of viola-
tions of Thirteenth Amendment and right to travel guarantees. 92 In a
significant phrase later adopted in Bray, the Carpenters majority charac-
terized Griffin as a case where "we upheld the application of § 1985(3) to
private conspiracies aimed at interfering with rights constitutionally pro-
tected against private, as well as official, encroachment.
'93
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
O'Connor, dissented. Justice Blackmun wrote:
In Griffin v. Breckenridge, we reaffirmed our general approach to
Reconstruction civil rights statutes including § 1985(3). Those
statutes are to be given "a sweep as broad as [their] language." In
the 12 years since Griffin, that principle has not lost its vitality. I
see no basis for the Court's crabbed and uninformed reading of the
words of § 1985(3). 9'
C. Sex and Pregnancy Discrimination
1. Sex Discrimination, Pregnancy Discrimination, and Equal Protection
Doctrine.
The equal protection language in § 1985(3) 9" is similar to language
in the Fourteenth Amendment.96 The Bray Justices disagreed about the
influence that Fourteenth Amendment doctrine should have in constru-
ing the meaning of "equal protection" in the statute.97 They also dis-
agreed about how the constitutional doctrine itself, as applied to sex and
pregnancy discrimination, should best be understood.
Before 1971, women were viewed, for equal protection purposes, as
fundamentally different from men; thus it was reasonable and constitu-
tional for legislation to classify persons according to their sex.98 The first
92. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 832-33. The Griffin Court had stated that the Thirteenth
Amendment's protection extended "far beyond" prohibiting the actual imposition of slavery or
involuntary servitude and that Congress was "wholly within its powers under § 2 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment in creating a statutory cause of action for Negro citizens who have been
the victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving them of
the basic rights that the law secures to all free men." Grffin, 403 U.S. at 105.
93. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833.
94. Id. at 854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
95. "If one or more persons... conspire ... for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3) (1993).
96. "No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
97. See discussion infra part III.A.l.a.(2).
98. Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and




Supreme Court decision to invalidate a gender classification under the
Equal Protection Clause was Reed v. Reed,99 where the Court said that a
statute creating a preference for men over women of the same entitlement
class in estate administration violated the Equal Protection Clause "by
providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are... similarly
situated.' '""o The applicable standard was that sex-based classifications
must have a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation." '
Two years later in Frontiero v. Richardson,"2 a plurality of the
Court 0 3 struck down a law that allowed servicemen, but not ser-
vicewomen, to claim their spouses as dependents without demonstrating
actual dependency. The plurality said that "classifications based upon
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are
inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial
scrutiny.''I°4
The Frontiero plurality's strict scrutiny standard for sex discrimina-
tion, however, was never adopted by a majority of the Court. The stan-
dard that now appears to control is the one announced in Craig v.
Boren,105 that "classifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." ' 106 The Craig standard is often termed an intermediate
standard of review;10 7 it is more stringent than the "rational relation-
ship" test °1 but less stringent than the "strict scrutiny" test applied to
suspect classifications such as race and national origin, and to classifica-
tions impacting fundamental rights such as voting and interstate
travel. 109
The question of whether discrimination based on pregnancy should
be considered sex discrimination has been problematic for both the Court
and legal theorists.110 The Court so far has held that pregnancy discrimi-
99. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
100. Id. at 77.
101. Id. at 76.
102. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
103. The plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, Douglas, White, and Marshall.
104. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688.
105. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
106. lId at 197. Craig struck down a law prohibiting the sale of "non-intoxicating" beer to
males under 21 and females under 18.
107. KAY, supra note 98, at 44.
108. Id. at 19. The rational relationship test was articulated in McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961): "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Id at 426. In practice, the test is very lenient,
permitting the use of most legislative classifications. KAY, supra note 98, at 19.
109. The strict scrutiny test is typically articulated as a requirement that a classification
must be necessary to a compelling state purpose. Williams, supra note 98, at 178 n.22.
110. Id. at 190-200.
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nation is not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. In Geduldig v.
Aiello" ' the Court upheld a pregnancy-based distinction that had been
challenged on equal protection grounds. The classification at issue was a
California insurance system's exclusion of pregnancy benefits from its
coverage. The Court found the "line drawn by the state... rationally
supportable." '12 The text of the opinion did not discuss sex discrimina-
tion, focusing instead on the question of costs; the critical portion of the
opinion where sex discrimination was addressed was confined to the now
notorious"' footnote 20:
The dissenting opinion to the contrary, this case is thus a far cry
from those like Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson, involv-
ing discrimination based upon gender as such.114 The California
insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility
because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-
pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is
true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that
every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based
classification like those considered in Reed and Frontiero. Normal
pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with
unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involv-
ing pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious dis-
crimination against the members of one sex or the other,
lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude preg-
nancy from the coverage of legislation ....
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gen-
der as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the
most cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients
into two groups-pregnant women and non-pregnant persons.
While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes
111. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
112. Id. at 495.
113. Geduldig has been widely criticized. See Respondents' Brief at 17 n.43, Bray v. Alex-
andria, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-985), available in LEXIS, GENFED library, BRIEFS
file (citing Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 983-
84 nn.107-09 (1984), as the source for several dozen citations of articles critical of Geduldig
and Gilbert).
114. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, dissented, asserting that
Reed and Frontiero mandated a stricter standard of scrutiny. Brennan wrote:
[B]y singling out for less favorable treatment a gender-linked disability peculiar to
women, the State has created a double standard for disability compensation: a limi-
tation is imposed upon the disabilities for which women workers may recover, while
men receive full compensation for all disabilities suffered, including those that affect
only or primarily their sex, such as prostatectomies, circumcision, hemophilia, and
gout. In effect, one set of rules is applied to females and another to males. Such
dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical characteristics inex-
tricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination.
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 501 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent found in the majority's deci-
sion an apparent "willing[ness] to abandon [the] higher standard of review [of Reed, Frontiero,
and other cases]" and declined to join "the Court's apparent retreat." Id. at 503.
BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA
members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the pro-
gram thus accrue to members of both sexes.
115
The Court relied on the Geduldig majority's footnote 20 to uphold a
similar disability plan in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.116 In response,
Congress overruled Gilbert in 1978 by enacting the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act (PDA)117 which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to prohibit sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.118
Several Supreme Court cases used the PDA to strike down preg-
nancy based classifications. In Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC 19 the Court held that an insurance plan that provided full
maternity benefits for female employees but only partial maternity bene-
fits for the wives of male employees violated the PDA by discriminating
against the male employees.' 20 In Automobile Workers v. Johnson Con-
trois121 the Court held that the PDA barred an employer from excluding
fertile women from jobs entailing risk of harm to fetuses which the wo-
men might conceive, 122 stating that "[t]he bias in Johnson Controls' pol-
icy is obvious. Fertile men, but not fertile women, are given a choice as
to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular
job.... [The] policy explicitly discriminates against women on the basis
of their sex .... [It] creates a facial classification based on gender."
1 23
The reach of the PDA, however, does not extend beyond employ-
ment, and doctrine established in cases applying the PDA does not con-
trol when claims are based on other statutes or on the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection clause. Even though Congress, in enact-
ing the PDA, intended to express disapproval of both the holding and
reasoning of Gilbert,124 and even though Newport News and Johnson Con-
trols clearly equated pregnancy discrimination with sex discrimination,
the rationale of Geduldig and Gilbert-that classifications based on preg-
nancy are not necessarily sex-based classifications-while seemingly dis-
credited, has not actually been overruled outside the employment
context. The issue has not been resolved; an important aspect of Bray is
the disagreement between the majority and dissents about the "continu-
115. Id. at 496-97 n.20 (citations shortened).
116. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1993).
118. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 670 & n.1 (1983).
119. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
120. Id.
121. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
122. The Company's policy was the following: "[I]t is [Johnson Controls'] policy that wo-
men who are pregnant or who are capable of bearing children will not be placed into jobs
involving lead exposure." Id. at 1200. The policy defined "women... capable of bearing
children" as "[a]ll women except those whose inability to bear children is medically docu-
mented." Id.
123. Id. at 1202.
124. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678.
Summer 19931
920 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 20:905
ing vitality"'125 of Geduldig and its applicability to a § 1985(3) claim.'
26
2. Sex Discrimination and § 1985(3)
The question of whether § 1985(3) covers sex or pregnancy discrimi-
nation arises because of the unresolved "perhaps" in the Griffin require-
ment that there be "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus." 2 7
The issue of § 1985(3)'s coverage of sex discrimination was directly
addressed for the first time at the appellate level in 1978 in Novotny v.
Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association,121 where the Third
Circuit held that § 1985(3) did protect against conspiracies motivated by
discriminatory animus against women.129 The circuit court reviewed the
statutory history and concluded that the drafters did not intend to ex-
clude women. 3 ° It also relied on Frontiero v. Richardson, Reed v. Reed,
and Craig v. Boren to conclude that sex discrimination was "inherently
invidious."'
13
The Supreme Court overturned Novotny132 on the narrow issue that
a § 1985(3) complaint could not rest on a right created by Title VII. 133
The issue of sex discrimination was not mentioned in the plurality's opin-
ion, but the concurring and dissenting opinions did discuss it. Justice
Powell stated that § 1985(3) should apply only to conspiracies that "vio-
late... fundamental rights derived from the Constitution,"'' 34 and that
there was no constitutionally created right to be free from private sex
discrimination. 31 Justice Stevens expressed a similar view.' 36 Justice
White, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, said that it
"is clear that sex discrimination may be sufficiently invidious to come
125. Bray, 113 S.Ct. at 761 n.3.
126. See discussion infra part III.A.l.a.(3).
127. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). See discussion supra part I.2.c.(2).
128. 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
129. Id. at 1262. The case involved a male employee fired for advocating equal rights for
women within his company.
130. Id. at 1241-43.
131. Id. at 1243.
132. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
133. The relevant words of § 1985(3) define the cause of action as a conspiracy "for the
purpose of depriving ... any person ... of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws." 42 U.S.C § 1985(3) (1980). At issue here is which
laws are included in "the laws." The majority held that if a Title VII violation could be
asserted through § 1985(3), a plaintiff could avoid Title VII's detailed administrative proce-
dures and limitations on damages. Novotny, 442 U.S. at 375-76. (For an opposing view, see
the dissent of Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall, id. at 385-396).
134. Id. at 379 (Powell, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 381.
136. Id. at 381-85 (Stevens, J., concurring). This appears quite different from his opinion
in Bray. See infra note 258 and accompanying text.
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within the prohibition of section 1985(3)." 137
The Supreme Court also considered the class-based animus clause in
Carpenters. The majority, while identifying one specific class (economic)
that was not protected, again specifically declined to decide which classes
were. 138 Bray also declined to decide which classes were covered.139
Thus, to date, the Supreme Court has left the question open.
In cases involving abortion clinic blockades, a further question
arises: if § 1985(3) does protect women as a class, does that mean it also
protects women seeking abortions? Before Bray, the Supreme Court had
not addressed the question of abortion seekers as a class; numerous lower
courts, however, had. Most of the lower courts that addressed the issue
ruled that blockades against abortion seekers do constitute gender-based
animus for purposes of § 1985(3).14"
D. The Requirement of a Right Protected Against Private Infringement
After Carpenters, § 1985(3) plaintiffs, in addition to showing a class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus, were also required to show
there was a conspiracy which involved state action or, if the conspiracy
was private, that it was aimed at a right the Constitution protects against
private infringement.
The most common and successful way that plaintiffs in lower court
§ 1985(3) abortion blockade cases met this requirement was by alleging
infringement of the right to interstate travel."' It certainly appeared
137. Id. at 389 n.6 (White, J. dissenting).
138. Justice Blackmun, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor
assumed that sex discrimination was covered:
[The Forty-Second] Congress intended to provide a remedy to any class of persons,
whose beliefs or associations placed them in danger of not receiving equal protection
of the laws from local authorities. While certain class traits, such as race, religion,
sex, and national origin, per se meet this requirement, other traits also may implicate
the functional concerns in particular situations.
United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 853 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis in original).
139. See infra part III.A.1.a.(1).
140. See Southwestern Medical Clinics v. Operation Rescue, 744 F. Supp. 230 (D. Nev.
1989); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 710 F. Supp. 577, 581 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Cousins v. Terry, 721
F. Supp. 426, 430 (N.D.N.Y. 1989); New York State NOW v. Terry, 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1259
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), af&'d, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947; Portland
Feminist Women's Health Ctr. v. Advocates for Life, 712 F. Supp. 165, 169 (D. Or. 1988),
affid, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988); but see Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan,
866 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1989); Roe v. Abortion Abolition Soc'y, 811 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); National Abortion Fed'n v. Operation Rescue, 721 F. Supp.
1168, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
141. See, e.g. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1493 (E.D. Va. 1989), affid,
914 F.2d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in part, vacated in part sub nor. Bray v. Alexandria,
113 S. Ct. 753 (1993); See also Women's Health Care Services v. Operation Rescue-Nat'l, 773
F. Supp. 258, 266 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd sub nor. Volunteer Medical Clinic v. Operation
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well settled that proving interference with the right to travel was suffi-
cient to meet the requirement articulated in Carpenters.1 42 The
Carpenters Court itself said that § 1985(3) "constitutionally can and
does" protect the right to travel guaranteed by the Federal Constitution
from interference by purely private conspiracies. '43 The Court in Griffin
made the same point, stating that "[o]ur cases have firmly established
that the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected, does not
necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against
private as well as governmental interference." 144 Furthermore, the
Court has explicitly recognized that the right to travel interstate to seek
abortions is constitutionally protected.
1 45
Some plaintiffs claimed that demonstrators infringed their right to
abortion. '46 Such claims have not been successful in establishing the req-
uisite conspiracy. The right to abortion is generally recognized as being
based on the right to privacy guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,147 and since the Amendment only addresses state action, the right
to abortion does not meet the requirement that private conspiracies be
aimed at a right guaranteed against private interference.
E. State Action
If plaintiffs can show that a conspiracy involved state action, they do
not need to show that it was aimed at a right guaranteed against private
impairment. Some plaintiffs have tried this tactic, with mixed success.
The district court in Women's Health Care held that plaintiffs had
demonstrated the requisite state involvement 4 ' by showing that Opera-
tion Rescue had purposefully acted to circumvent effective police protec-
Rescue, 948 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1991). (Volunteer Medical Clinic overruled Women's Health
Care on the facts alone; although the circuit said it could not rule for plaintiffs because they
had made no allegations that patients travelled interstate, it reaffirmed the rule that the right to
travel was constitutionally protected against private interference. Volunteer Medical Clinic,
948 F.2d at 227.)
142. See Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 832-33. The Bray Court, however, held otherwise. See
infra part II.A.2.a.
143. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 832-33.
144. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971). The right to travel from one state to
another is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but it is nevertheless considered a basic
constitutional right. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631 (1969); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-760 (1960).
145. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
146. See, e.g. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1493-94; Women's Health Care
Services, 773 F. Supp. at 265.
147. Like the right to interstate travel, the right to privacy, although not explicitly men-
tioned in the Constitution, is considered a constitutional right. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
148. The court said: "To state a claim under § 1985(3), the plaintiff need not demonstrate
the existence of state actors in the conspiracy. It is sufficient if the plaintiff demonstrates state
involvement generally, or that the conspiracy is directed at influencing the activity of the
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tion of the plaintiffs and their supporters. 14 9 Similar arguments were also
successful in New York State NOW v. Terry' and Portland Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Advocates for Life.151 But Women's Health
Care Services was overruled; the appellate court said the involvement of
the police was not enough to show state action and that there was no
evidence of police complicity with the demonstrators. 152 Roe v. Opera-
tion Rescue'53 reached a similar conclusion. The district court in NOW
v. Operation Rescue called this argument (which it did not reach)
"doubtful."1
54
In summary, before Bray the law was as follows: The Supreme
Court left open the question of whether class-based animus could be
based on anything other than racial bias, but most of the lower courts
held that it applied to animus directed at women in general and at abor-
tion seekers in particular. The Court had imposed a state action or right
protected against private infringement requirement on § 1985(3); in the
abortion blockade context, this was met most successfully by showing
violations of the right to interstate travel.
F. Facts and Procedural History of Bray
1. District Court Decision
a. Facts
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia decided the
case, then called NOW v. Operation Rescue, 155 in December 1989, and
issued a permanent injunction against the protests.'56 The plaintiffs were
nine clinics that provided abortions or abortion counseling and five pro-
State." Women's Health Care Services, 773 F. Supp. at 265 (emphasis added). For support,
the court cited Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 830.
149. Women's Health Care Services, 773 F. Supp. at 265-66. The court quoted the
"preventing or hindering" language of the hindrance clause, but did not otherwise emphasize
the fact that it was relying on the hindrance clause. Id. at 265. For authority, the court cited
Justice Stevens's concurrence in Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 336,
384 (1979).
150. 704 F. Supp. 1247, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), ajf'd, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). This was also a hindrance claim argument.
151. 712 F. Supp. 165, 168 (D. Or. 1988), aff'd, 859 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1988).
152. Volunteer Medical Clinic v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 227 (6th Cir. 1991).
153. 710 F. Supp. 577, 582-83 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
154. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1494 n.11 (E.D. Va. 1989). Justice
Souter, however, relied on a factual finding from the district court case to support his conten-
tion that the hindrance clause issue had been properly raised. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 770 (Souter,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at
1489 n.4).
155. 726 F. Supp 1483, 1488 (E.D. Va., 1989), aff'd, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd in
part, vacated in part sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993).
156. Id. at 1487.
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choice organizations;157 the defendants, Operation Rescue and six indi-
vidual anti-abortion activists.
158
Plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the protesters "from tres-
passing on, sitting in, blocking, impeding or obstructing ingress into or
egress from, any facility in the Washington Metropolitan area that offers
and provides legal abortion services and related medical and psychologi-
cal counselling."' 15 9 Plaintiffs alleged two violations of § 1985(3)--con-
spiracy to interfere with the right to interstate travel and conspiracy to
interfere with privacy rights-and three pendent state causes of action-
trespass, public nuisance, and tortious interference with business."6
The court made the following factual findings: Defendants had a
"deep commitment" to stopping abortion. 6' Their "rescue" demonstra-
tions created a substantial risk that patients might suffer physical
harm162 as well as stress, anxiety, and mental harm.163 Substantial num-
bers of patients travelled from out of state to reach the clinics. "Res-
cues" thus obstructed and interfered with the women's interstate
travel.'" Defendants' use of "rescue" demonstrations was not a recent
phenomenon 165 and was geographically widespread; "rescues" had been
enjoined in New York, Pennsylvania, Washington, Connecticut, Califor-
nia, and the Washington Metropolitan area.' 66 Defendants would not
assure the court that they planned to refrain from conducting "rescue"
157. Id. The organizations were: National Organization for Women, 51st State National
Organization for Women, Maryland National Organization for Women, Virginia National Or-
ganization for Women, and Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc. Id.
158. Id. at 1487-88. Randall Terry was one of the individual defendants. He was in jail at
the time of the NOW v. Operation Rescue decision. Id. at 1488.
159. Id. at 1486.
160. Id. at 1490-95.
161. Id. at 1488.
162. Id. at 1489. The court found the witnesses "convincingly illustrated this point." Id.
The court gave as an example patients who had received a pre-abortion laminaria to achieve
cervical dilation. "In these instances, timely removal of the laminaria is necessary to avoid
infection, bleeding, and other potentially serious complications." Id. If the rescuers have
closed the clinic, patients must either delay treatment, which is risky, or seek it elsewhere.
There were, however, "numerous economic and psychological barriers" to obtaining treatment
elsewhere. Id. For indigent patients, in particular, obtaining treatment elsewhere might be
impossible. Id. at 1489 n.3.
163. Id at 1489.
164. Id.
165. Id. For example, for the preceding five years Operation Rescue had been targeting
one of the plaintiff clinics on an almost weekly basis. Id. In one of those demonstrations, the
clinic was closed for more than six-and-a-half hours, despite the efforts of police. The police,
as was typical during the demonstrations, were outnumbered by the demonstrators. Id. at
1489 & 1489 n.4. Beyond trespassing and blocking entrances and exits, demonstrators have
blocked access to and from the parking lots, damaged clinic signs and fences, and scattered
nails in the parking lots and abutting public streets. Id. at 1489-90.
166. Id. Recent demonstrations were carried out in violation of federal injunctions in the
District of Columbia and Maryland: Id.
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demonstrations. The court concluded that there was a substantial likeli-
hood that defendants would, in fact, carry out such demonstrations in
Northern Virginia in the immediate future.16 7 The court also concluded
that "unless the threatened and unlawful acts to those clinics are imme-
diately and permanently enjoined substantial and irreparable harm will
be suffered by the plaintiffs and their members and patients who seek the
services of the clinics."
168
b. Legal Issues
(1) § 1985(3) Issues
(a) Right to Interstate Travel
The district court cited Griffin v. Breckenridge 69 and United Broth-
erhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott 7' for the proposition that a
cause of action under § 1985(3) has four essential elements:
(i) a conspiracy; (ii) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
[and] (iii) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (iv) whereby a
person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any
right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.17 1
The court disposed of the first element quickly, finding "[a]mple rec-
ord evidence" of a conspiracy among defendants.' 72
As a threshold issue for the "purpose" element, the court stated that
the conspiracy must be "motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus,"'173 citing a Fourth Circuit case rather than Grif-
fin for this characterization. Although the circuit's language is similar, it
appears broader than the language used in Griffin. 74 The district court,
again citing the Fourth Circuit, held that gender-based animus satisfied
the second element because, to meet the class-based animus requirement,
the class must possess "discrete, insular and immutable characteristics
comparable to those characterizing classes such as race, national origin
and sex."' 7 5 It held that plaintiffs' members and patients formed a "sub-
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
170. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
171. Now v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1492 (E.D. Va. 1989).
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1257 (4th Cir. 1985)).
174. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 88. The Giffin Court said that "some racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus" must motivate the conspiracy. Id. at 102.
175. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1492 (citing Buschi, 775 F.2d at 1257).
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set" of a gender-based class meeting these requirements.176 It concluded
that "a conspiracy to deprive women seeking abortions of their rights
guaranteed by law is actionable under Section 1985(3)."
177
Once past this threshold question, the court held that the second
element of the claim was satisfied because defendants engaged in this
conspiracy for the purpose "of depriving women seeking abortions and
related medical and counselling services, of the right to travel."1 78 Citing
Doe v. Bolton,179 the court stated that the right to travel included the
right to unobstructed interstate travel to obtain an abortion and other
medical services.18 The court found that plaintiff clinics provided serv-
ices to patients who travelled from out of state, and did not believe that
clinic closings affected only intra-state travel from the street to the doors:
"Were the [c]ourt to hold otherwise, interference with the right to travel
could occur only at state borders."1 '' Furthermore, the court held that
plaintiffs need not show state action, because the right to interstate travel
was protected from purely private as well as governmental
interference.1
8 2
The court quickly disposed of the third and fourth elements of the
claim. It found that the "overt act" requirement was "plainly satis-
fied,"" 3 and that the "injury" requirement was satisfied because of the
continued threat to plaintiffs' exercise of their federally guaranteed right
to travel.184 The court concluded that all of the elements of a violation of
1985(3) were "clearly established" and that plaintiffs were therefore enti-
tled to relief.1
85
(b) Right to Privacy
Plaintiffs' second claim under § 1985(3) was that defendants' dem-
onstrations "infringe[d] on the fundamental right of plaintiffs' members
and patients to obtain an abortion."' 186 The court seemed quite eager to
avoid deciding this issue: "[I]t is unnecessary and imprudent to venture
into this thicket."' 187 The court found it unnecessary to address the right
176. Id. The court stated that "[t]here is, to be sure, a lack of uniformity among courts on
this issue [b]ut the majority of courts have concluded that a gender-based animus satisfies the
conspiracy requirement of § 1985(3)." Id. at 1492-93 (citations omitted).
177. Id. at 1493.
178. Id.
179. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
180. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1493.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-06 and New York State NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d





187. Id. at 1494.
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to privacy because it had already ruled in favor of plaintiffs on the inter-
state travel claim. It found it imprudent to address the issue because it
considered the claim "problematic." ' Plaintiffs had argued, with what
the court characterized as "some lack of clarity," that "the putative right
to an abortion is of such a fundamental character as to be guaranteed
against all interference, not just governmental interference." ' 9 The
court thought the claim was problematic not only because it was
"novel," but also because the recent decision in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services"' "suggest[ed] that the law concerning a putative abor-
tion right is in a state of flux."'
191
(2) State Law Issues
The court ruled in favor of plaintiffs on their trespass and public
nuisance claims. 192 It dismissed without prejudice the tortious interfer-
ence with business relationships claim. 193
(3) Remedy
The district court held that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive re-
lief because there was no adequate remedy at law, the balance of the
equities "weigh[ed] decisively" in plaintiffs' favor, and the public interest
would be served.194 It enjoined defendants from "in any manner or by
any means, trespassing on, blockading, impeding or obstructing access to
or egress from" the premises of the plaintiff clinics and other clinics in
specified Virginia cities and counties.195 However, the court denied
plaintiffs' request for a nationwide injunction. It also turned down plain-
tiffs' request to enjoin "those 'rescue' activities that tend to intimidate,
harass or disturb patients or potential patients" on the ground that de-
fendants have a First Amendment right to express their views. 196
2. Appellate Court Decision
In a short opinion, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
188. Id.
189. Id. The court here, unlike the Bray dissenters, assumed that state action was required
for a § 1985(3) claim. Id. at n. 11. The court did note that there was "some authority" for
finding that the failure of protestors to notify police could constitute state action, but plaintiffs
had not argued the point. Id.
190. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
191. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. at 1494. The court explained that Webster
left Roe "ripe for attack" by casting doubt on the future validity of the trimester framework.
Id. at 1494 n.13.
192. Id. at 1494-95.
193. Id. at 1495.
194. Id. at 1496.
195. Id. at 1497.
196. Id.
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decision in all respects. 197 The appellate court explained: "We affirm the
judgment because the district court found that the activities of appellants
in furtherance of their beliefs had crossed the line from persuasion into
coercion and operated to deny the exercise of rights protected by law."
198
The appellate court also found that the legal premises of the district
court on the class-based animus question were "consistent with the law
of the circuits."' 199 Like the district court, the appellate court specifically
declined to reach the question of whether § 1985(3) could encompass vi-
olations of a right to privacy.
3. First Argument Before Supreme Court
In their briefs, the clinics based their argument on (1) former circuit
court and Supreme. Court opinions dealing with § 1985(3) and related
statutes; (2) the statute's language; (3) the legislative history; and (4) the
statute's "basic purpose to provide protections to persons who may be
victimized by private actions directed at their rights."201
Operation Rescue also relied on the legislative history, 2 as did the
Justice Department which, although it conceded that "the breadth of the
terms used ... could be read to encompass gender-based animus,"2 3
argued that there was no need for the Court to decide the issue; the rele-
vant issue was not whether women as a whole constitute a protected
class, but whether women seeking abortions do.2" This was the position
that the Court adopted.
The Justice Department's brief relied heavily on Geduldig v.
Aiello:20 5
Although Geduldig did not involve Section 1985(3), the Court's
reasoning in that case is applicable here. In fact, this Court's anal-
ysis in Geduldig applies even-more forcefully in the abortion con-
text. Here, as in Geduldig, there are two relevant categories -
persons involved in the abortion process, and everyone else - and
neither class is exclusively female; each category includes both wo-
men and men.206
The Justice Department distinguished Automobile Workers v. John-
son Controls207 and Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v.
197. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d 582, 586 (4th Cir. 1990).
198. Id. at 585.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 586.
201. Respondents' Brief, supra note 113, at 11-12.
202. Petitioners' Reply Brief, supra note 1, at 5 n.7.
203. Brief for United States at 10-11, Bray v. Alexandria, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (No. 90-
985), available in LEXIS, GENFED library, BRIEFS file.
204. Id. at 11.
205. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See discussion supra part I.C.1.
206. Brief for United States, supra note 203, at 14.
207. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). See discussion supra part I.C.1.
EEOC2°8 on the grounds that Congress drew "a line for purposes of Title
VII that differs from the one that this Court drew for equal protection
purposes in Geduldig," and that Geduldig, therefore, still applied.20 9 Re-
spondents replied that Geduldig did not apply because it did not deal
with the specific § 1985(3) issue and because Johnson Controls and New-
port News have made Geduldig largely irrelevant.21 0
Operation Rescue contended that opposition to abortion was not
gender-based discrimination because it was directed only at a minority
"subset" of women, that is, those seeking an abortion or abortion coun-
seling.211 Respondents replied that many sex-discrimination cases apply
to "subsets" of women; for example, Johnson Controls applied only to
women of childbearing age who wished to work in jobs where exposure
to lead may be a risk.212
4. Decision to Hold Over for Rehearing
Bray was argued, but not decided, during the 1991-92 term.213 It
was reargued in 1992. The plaintiffs moved to fie a supplemental brief
on reargument. The Court, with Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and
O'Connor dissenting on the record, granted the motion with respect to
arguments addressing the potential significance of Casey and the availa-
bility of injunctive relief, but denied the motion with respect to argu-
ments addressing the hindrance clause.214
II. Summary of the Case
A. The Majority Opinion - Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, Kennedy,
and Thomas
The majority characterized the case as presenting the question of
whether the first clause (the "deprivation" clause) of § 1985(3)215 pro-
208. 462 U.S. 669 (1983). See discussion supra part I.C.1.
209. Brief for United States, supra note 203, at 14-15.
210. Respondents' Brief, supra note 113, at 16.
211. Brief for United States, supra note 203, at 12.
212. Respondents' Brief, supra note 113, at 17.
213. The Court did not explain why it decided to hold the case over for reargument. At
the time, many observers speculated that the case, which was argued before Clarence Thomas
joined the Court, had split evenly. A spokeswoman for NOW speculated that the delay was
political, intended to protect President Bush from an unfavorable reaction. Others, however,
suggested this was unlikely, because the decision to reargue was unanimous. Ruth Marcus,
Court Postpones Abortion Protest Case, WASH. PosT, June 9, 1992, at Al.
214. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 14 (1992). Justice O'Connor merely said she would grant the entire
motion; Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, made a stronger argument in favor of
hearing the hindrance claim. Id Although Justice Souter did not dissent on the record, he
said in Bray that he had voted to grant the motion to hear the hindrance claim argument. Id.
at 771 (Souter, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
215. "If two or more persons... conspire... for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws.., the party so
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vides a federal cause of action against persons obstructing access to abor-
tion clinics 216 and held that it does not.
217
Relying on Griffin and Carpenters,218 the majority said there are two
requirements a plaintiff must show to prove a violation of the "depriva-
tion" clause of § 1985(3): "(1) that 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspira-
tors' action,' and (2) that the conspiracy 'aimed at interfering with rights'
that are 'protected against private, as well as official, encroachment.' 1219
The Court held that neither requirement was satisfied. There was
no class-based animus because "women seeking abortions" are not a pro-
tected class220; furthermore, even if "women in general" were a protected
class (an issue the Court declined to address), the protests were not
aimed at women generally.22'
There was no protected right because the right to interstate travel,
while protected against private interference, was not implicated in this
case, 22 and the right to abortion is not protected against private
interference.223
Although the majority held that the claim that defendants had vio-
lated the "hindrance" clause was not before the Court,224 they discussed
it anyway and implied that it would fail.225
The Court remanded the case for consideration of whether the state-
law claims alone could support the injunction.226
B. The Concurrence: Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy, who joined in the opinion of the Court, also wrote
separately in order to point out that a federal remedy already exists: 42
U.S.C. § 10501 gives states the right to petition the U.S. Attorney Gen-
injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages... against one or more of
the conspirators." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
216. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 757-778.
217. Id. at 758.
218. See supra, parts I.B.2.c.-d.
219. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758 (citing for the first proposition, Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 and, for
the second proposition, Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 833).
220. Id. at 759.
221. Id. at 759-762.
222. Id at 762-63.
223. Id. at 764.
224. Id. at 764-65.
225. Id. at 765-67.
226. Id. at 768. Even if the injunction remains in place, the plaintiffs will have lost the
benefit of federal law enforcement. This is important because organized abortion protesters
can often overwhelm local police departments. See Federal News Service, Hearing of the Sen-
ate Labor Committee, May 12, 1993.
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eral for federal law enforcement assistance.227
C. Souter, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
On the basis of stare decisis, Justice Souter agreed with the major-
ity's reliance on Griffin and Carpenters in construing the "deprivation"
clause.228 To the extent that the Court's decision was based on that
clause, he concurred in the judgment.
The passage devoted to Justice Souter's concurrence was very short.
Virtually all of Souter's opinion was devoted to his dissent, which fo-
cused on the "hindrance" clause.229 He extensively criticized Giffin and
Carpenters and said that the restrictions these cases imposed on the first
clause should not be applied to the second. He believed that Bray should
have been decided on the basis of hindrance clause claims. Although he
believed that the claim could be supported by reading "between the
lines" of the District Court's conclusions, he would have remanded the
case for an express finding that the protests had a purpose of preventing
or hindering the authorities from securing the equal protection of the
laws.
230
D. Dissent: Justices Stevens and Blackmun
In a strong dissent, Justice Stevens defended the position of the
plaintiffs. He called the actions of Operation Rescue "a striking contem-
porary example of the kind of zealous, politically motivated, lawless con-
duct that led to the enactment of the Ku Klux Act in 1871 and gave it its
name."
231
The plain language of the text, Stevens said, clearly shows that the
statute covers the plaintiffs.232 Furthermore, there was no reason to go
beyond the language. Although Griffin had imposed a narrowing con-
struction, it did so for reasons that did not apply here.
The question of whether the statute applies to sex discrimination
was "easily answered '2 33 in the affirmative. Furthermore, the protests
discriminated against women.234 Therefore, the class-based animus re-
227. Id. at 769. Justice Stevens had the following reaction: "Justice Kennedy's reminder
that the Court's denial of any relief to individual respondents does not prevent their States
from calling on the United States, through its Attorney General, for help is both puzzling and
ironic, given the role [the Bush] Administration has played in this and related cases in support
of Operation Rescue." Id. at 799 n.38 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
228. Id. at 769-770 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229. He called it the "prevention" clause, but for consistency this Comment uses "hin-
drance," the term used in all the other opinions.
230. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 779.
231. Id. at 782.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 785.
234. Id. at 785-89.
Summer 19931 BRAY v. ALEXANDRIA
932 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 20:905
quirement was satisfied. The protected right requirement was also satis-
fied because the plaintiffs' right to travel had been "deliberately and
significantly infringed. 235 Justice Stevens also believed that the plaintiffs
"unquestionably" had established a claim under the "hindrance"
clause,236 because the demonstrators hindered the police from protecting
"women's constitutionally protected right to choose whether to end their
pregnancies. ' '237
E. Dissent: O'Connor and Blackmun
Justice O'Connor argued that the language of the statute clearly
covered the protesters' actions.238 The protesters' actions also met the
class-based animus requirement; they were directly related to the ability
to become pregnant and to terminate pregnancies, characteristics
"unique to the class of women." '239
Justice O'Connor reaffirmed her Carpenters dissent and declined to
discuss the merits of the majority's argument that the private impairment
requirement was not satisfied.24" Instead, she based her conclusion on
her belief that the plaintiffs "unquestionably" established a claim under
the "hindrance" clause; the District Court's factual findings were suffi-
cient to establish a "hindrance" clause claim.241
III. Analysis
A. The Deprivation Clause24 2
1. Griffin and Carpenters
a. Are Griffin and Carpenters Still Good Law?
Griffin v. Breckenridge243 and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners v. Scott2" imposed requirements on § 1985(3) plaintiffs that are
not present in the text of the statute itself.245 Carpenters was a close
decision; four members of the Court246 wrote a strong dissent, stating
they saw "no basis for the Court's crabbed and uninformed reading of
§ 1985(3). "1247 The Griffin decision has also been controversial. Thus,
235. Id. at 795.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 796.
238. Id. at 799-800 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 802.
240. Id. at 801, 804.
241. Id. at 804-05.
242. See supra parts I.B.2.c.-d.
243. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
244. 463 U.S. 825 (1983).
245. See discussion supra parts I.B.2.c.-d.
246. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor.
247. Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 854 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Bray presented the Court with an opportunity to reexamine whether the
§ 1985(3) precedents were correctly decided.248
The fact that Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Blackmun, and Souter all
expressed varying degrees of uneasiness either with the precedents them-
selves or with their applicability to this particular case shows that this
was a difficult question.
For the majority, however, it was a non-issue. They did not even go
so far as to expressly decline to consider it. Instead, they simply stated,
"[o]ur precedents establish that . .. 249 and went on to quote the lan-
guage from Griffin and Carpenters that provided the framework on
which they based their decision.250
The majority's reliance on the Griffin and Carpenters requirements
was crucial to its conclusion that § 1985(3) did not apply to abortion
blockades. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Blackmun, and Souter, however,
believed that despite the precedents, the statute should or (in the case of
Souter) probably should apply. They took different approaches to reach-
ing this conclusion. Justice Stevens did not attack the validity of the
precedents but instead argued that they did not apply to this case. Jus-
tice O'Connor reaffirmed her Carpenters dissent and said that even if she
had agreed with the Carpenters decision, she would still find the statute
applied here. Justice Souter extensively criticized Griffin and, especially,
Carpenters, but said that stare decisis compelled him to go along with the
majority's decision to the extent it was based on the deprivation clause.
He said that the precedents, however, only applied to the deprivation
clause, that there was no need to import them into the hindrance clause,
that the hindrance clause was properly before the Court, and that it
probably applied to this case.2 51
Thus, Griffin and Carpenters remain good law, but the interpreta-
tion of the law appears unstable; four Justices argued that the precedents
should not be applied as stringently as had been done by the Bray major-
ity. Upcoming changes in the membership of the Court could easily tip
the balance. That would be a welcome change; a more generous ap-
proach would give needed protection to people seeking to exercise their
constitutional rights in the face of mob violence.
b. Griffin's Class-Based Animus Requirement
(1) Does Class-Based Animus Extend Beyond Race?
The question of whether class-based animus extends beyond race
was left open in Griffin, which stated there must be "some racial, or per-
248. See generally Scott-McLaughlin, supra note 43 (arguing that Griffin unduly restricted
the statute's scope and that an activist Court could address this question in Bray).
249. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 758.
250. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
251. See infra part III.B.
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haps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the
conspirators' action. 25 2 The majority in Bray did not answer the ques-
tion, holding only that § 1985(3) did not apply to the specific situation
before it.
25 3
Justice Stevens, however, said that the question left open in Griffin
was "easily answered. '2 4 "The text of the statute," he wrote, "provides
no basis for excluding from its coverage any cognizable class of persons
who are entitled to the equal protection of the laws, ' 255 and the legisla-
tive history confirms that the statute, though primarily motivated by the
violence directed at recently emancipated citizens, protects all citizens.25 6
Justice O'Connor agreed and added that at "the very least," the statute
should apply to classes that merit a heightened scrutiny standard under
the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.25 7
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Blackmun did not attack the Griffln
requirement itself; instead, they argued that the requirement did not limit
the statute's application only to classes based on race. Justice Souter,
however, challenged the Griffin requirement directly:
[W]hile [the Griffin] treatment did, of course, effectively narrow
the scope of the clause, it did so probably to the point of overkill,
unsupported by any indication of an understanding on the part of
Congress that the animus to deny equality of rights lying at the
heart of an equal protection violation as the legislation's sponsors
understood it would necessarily be an animus based on race or
some like character.258
He believed that Griffin wrongly construed the statute more nar-
rowly than "its obvious cognate in the [Fourteenth] Amendment ' 25 9 and
thought that instead, it should be applied to any form of discrimination
that would be impermissible under Fourteenth Amendment Equal Pro-
tection rational basis scrutiny.2 ° This strong statement in favor of an
extremely broad application is undercut, however, by Souter's insistence
on following the Griffin decision even though he disagreed with it.
Thus, there are three clear votes for extending the classes protected
under the deprivation clause. The unanswered question in Griffln and
Bray-whether § 1985(3) applies to lasses other than race-could even-
tually, after changes in Court personnel, be answered in the affirmative.
252. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
253. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
254. Id. at 785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
255. Id. (emphasis added).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 801. (O'Connor, Justice, dissenting).
258. Id. at 772 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Griffin, 403
U.S. at 100; CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at App. 188 (remarks of Rep. Willard) (1871);
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at 478 (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger) (1871)).
259. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 722 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
260. Id. at 773.
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This would be a good result; Justice Stevens's argument that the statu-
tory text and legislative history mandate such a result is persuasive and
sound.
(2) Does Class-Based Animus Apply to Women?
The majority rejected what it called the "apparent conclusion" of
the district court that opposition to abortion constitutes discrimination
against a class composed of "women seeking abortion."26 Because it
believed that a class defined in that way would not qualify for protection
under § 1985(3), the majority found it unnecessary and specifically de-
clined to decide whether, as a general rule, discrimination against women
would be actionable under the statute.262
Justices Stevens and O'Connor, by contrast, both directly addressed
the question.263 Justice Stevens said that "women are unquestionably a
protected class, '"26" and Justice O'Connor said that she "think[s] they
are." 265 Both Justices relied on Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protec-
tion doctrine. Justice Stevens defined a protected § 1985(3) class broadly
as "any cognizable class of persons entitled to the equal protection of the
laws."' 266 He stated that women were such a class because "[tihis Court
has repeatedly and consistently held that gender-based classifications are
subject to challenge on Constitutional grounds.
'26 7
261. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759. What the district court actually said was that "[p]laintiffs'
members and patients constitute a subset of a gender-based class meeting [the] requirements"
of class-based discriminatory animus. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1492
(E.D. Va. 1989) (emphasis added). See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
262. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 759.
263. Justice Souter did not directly address the specific question of sex discrimination, in-
stead arguing more generally that the statute "ought" to cover any discrimination that would
be impermissible under rational basis scrutiny. Ia at 773 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). What the statute "ought" to cover, however, is not what Souter believes it
does cover after Griffn.
264. Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265. Id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 785 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Mississippi Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)). Stevens's view in Bray appears different from his view in his
1979 Novotny concurrence, where he said:
Private discrimination on the basis of sex is not prohibited by the Constitution. The
right to be free of sex discrimination by other private parties is a statutory right that
was created almost a century after § 1985(3) was enacted. Because I do not believe
that statute was intended to provide a remedy for the violation of statutory rights-
let alone rights created by statutes that had not yet been enacted-I agree with the
Court's conclusion that it does not provide respondent with redress for injuries
caused by private conspiracies to discriminate on the basis of sex.
Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 385 (1979) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
Stevens's Novotny concurrence and his Bray dissent may be distinguishable. In Bray, he
said that women are a protected class (thus fulfilling the Griffin requirement), while in
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Justice O'Connor reached the same result, but her definition of pro-
tected classes is somewhat narrower than Stevens's: "At the very least,
the classes protected by § 1985(3) must encompass those classifications
that we have determined merit a heightened scrutiny of state action
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Clas-
sifications based on gender fall within that narrow category of protected
classes.
'268
Justice Stevens also discussed the legislative history, and in doing
so, made an important point:
Given then prevailing attitudes about the respective roles of males
and females in society, it is possible that the enacting legislators did
not anticipate protection of women against class-based discrimina-
tion. That, however, is not a sufficient reason for refusing to con-
strue the statutory text in accord with its plain meaning,
particularly when that construction fulfills the central purpose of
the legislation.269
I agree with Justice Stevens. Attitudes toward sex discrimination are dif-
ferent now then they were in the nineteenth century, and the law should,
if not lead, at least reflect that change.
Furthermore, by saying that race but not sex discrimination is
clearly actionable under the statute, the Court sends a message-just as it
does by applying only an intermediate level of scrutiny in Equal Protec-
tion Clause sex discrimination claims-that it is hesitant to deter sex dis-
crimination with the full use of all the powers at its disposal.
(3) Does Class-Based Animus Apply to Abortion-Seekers?
The majority quickly dismissed the notion that a group defined as
"women seeking abortions" could be a qualifying class. To the majority,
all that "women seeking abortions" connoted was "a group of individu-
als" whose actions the protesters had interfered with.270
Novotny, he believed that being free from private sex discrimination was not a protected right
(thus violating the requirement that we now identify with Carpenters). Still, the contrast in
tone between these two opinions is striking.
268. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 801. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Mississippi Univ. for Wo-
men v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-26 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)). Else-
where in her opinion, however, in reaffirming her Carpenters dissent, O'Connor expressed a
broader view. She said she believed that
"instead of contemplating a list of actionable class traits .... Congress had in mind a
functional definition of the scope of [§ 1985(3)]," and intended to "provide a federal
remedy for all classes that seek to exercise their legal rights in unprotected circum-
stances similar to those of the victims of Klan violence."
Id. at 801 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Carpenters, 463 U.S. at 851 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting)). Thus, in Carpenters, she would have found that § 1985(3) protected a class consist-
ing of non-union employees.
269. Id. at 785 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270. Id at 759.
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The majority spent more time arguing that the protests were not
directed at women in general. They presented a complicated rationale.
Operation Rescue described its motivation as stopping abortion. It did
not define its activities as being directed at women in general. The ma-
jority, apparently placing great weight on Operation Rescue's own de-
scription of its intent, concluded that unless opposition to abortion can
"reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based intent" or unless intent is
irrelevant, there would be no class-based animus.27 1
In arguing that opposition to abortion does not reflect a sex-based
intent, the majority presented an unconvincing hypothetical example
meant to contrast with Operation Rescue's actions: a tax on yarmulkes
would be a tax on Jews because the wearing of yarmulkes is "an irra-
tional object of disfavor" that is "engaged in exclusively or predomi-
nantly" by Jews.2 72 The majority argued that opposition to abortion, by
contrast, is not irrational: "Whatever one thinks of abortion, it cannot be
denied that there are common and respectable reasons for opposing it,
other than hatred of or condescension toward (or indeed any view at all
concerning) women as a class.""27 As support, the Court stated that men
and women are on both sides of the abortion issue.274 But this makes
little sense. If Jews were on both sides of the issue of yarmulke taxation,
would that make the tax any less class-based?
More important in terms of the impact of this case is the Court's
view that there are "common and respectable" reasons for opposing
abortion. This may certainly be true, but the fact is that abortion is con-
stitutionally protected, and § 1985(3) is designed to protect people seek-
ing to exercise their constitutional rights. That a desire to interfere with
such rights may be "common" is irrelevant. It is because there is opposi-
tion that rights need to be legally protected; if there were no opposition,
there would be no need for protective laws. For example, it is ludicrous
to think that enforcement of § 1985(3) against Klan activities would be
denied based on an argument that racism is common; instead, that would
be an argument for the necessity of the statute.
While the fact that yarmulkes are worn "exclusively or predomi-
nantly" by Jews apparently convinced the Court that any infringement
would be discriminatory, the fact that abortions are obtained exclusively
by women did not lead the Court to a similar conclusion. The majority
cited Geduldig v. Aiello for the proposition that laws affecting pregnancy
are not necessarily sex-based classifications.275
271. Id. at 766.
272. IM. at 760.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id at 760 (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20).
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Justices Stevens and O'Connor both distinguished statutory from
constitutional standards. Because Geduldig construed the reach of the
Equal Protection Clause, and because the two Justices believed that
§ 1985(3) should be interpreted more broadly than the constitutional
clause, they asserted that Geduldig did not apply.
276
Justice Stevens cited the PDA,277 Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock co. v. EEOC,278 and Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls279 as
support for his argument that for statutory purposes, pregnancy discrim-
ination is sex discrimination.280 Justice O'Connor also relied on the
PDA and Newport News for the same point.281 Justice Stevens said that
"as a matter of statutory interpretation, [he has] always believed that
rules that place special burdens on pregnant women discriminate on the
basis of sex."' 282 Neither Justice O'Connor nor Justice Stevens indicated
they would necessarily be willing to apply a similar interpretation to con-
stitutional claims. This is unfortunate; strong statements from them
might have hastened Geduldig's demise. Nevertheless, their comments
on why they believe that under § 1985(3) discrimination against abortion
seekers is class-based animus are eloquent and based, unlike the major-
283ity's opinion, on common sense.
276. Id. at 790-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 803.
277. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1993); see supra part I.C.I.
278. 462 U.S. 669, 670 & n.1 (1983); see supra part I.C.I.
279. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991); see supra part I.C.I.
280. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 791-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. Id at 803 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 791 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
283. The comments are worth quoting at length. Justice O'Connor wrote:
The victims of [defendants'] tortious activities are linked by their ability to become
pregnant and by their ability to terminate their pregnancies, characteristics unique to
the class of women. [Defendants'] activities are directly related to those class charac-
teristics and therefore, I believe, are appropriately described as class-based within the
meaning of our holding in Griffin.
Id. at 802 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens expressed a similar view:
[The animus] requirement-as well as the central purpose of the statute-is satisfied
if the conspiracy is aimed at conduct that only members of the protected class have
the capacity to perform. It is not necessary that the intended effect upon women be
the sole purpose of the conspiracy. It is enough that the conspiracy be motivated "at
least in part" by its adverse effects upon women.... Even assuming that the ultimate
and indirect consequence of [defendants'] blockade was the legitimate and non-dis-
criminatory goal of saving potential life, it is undeniable that the conspirators' imme-
diate purpose was to affect the conduct of women. Moreover, [defendants] target
women because of their sex, specifically, because of their capacity to become preg-
nant and to have an abortion.
Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
279 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (foot-
notes omitted).
Justice Stevens's interpretation of the demonstrators' motives is more insightful than the
majority's:
Ambivalence towards abortion pervades the majority's opinion.
Not only did the majority emphasize that there are "respectable" reasons
for opposing abortion, but they also said:
[Two of our cases deal specifically with the disfavoring of abor-
tion, and establish conclusively that it is not ipsofacto sex discrimi-
nation. In Maher v. Roe284 and Harris v. McRae,285 we held that
the constitutional test applicable to government abortion-funding
restrictions is not the heightened-scrutiny standard that our cases
demand for sex-based discrimination, see Craig v. Boren,286 but the
ordinary rationality standards.287
Furthermore, the court stated that "[w]hether one agrees or dis-
agrees with the goal of preventing abortion, that goal in itself... does
not remotely qualify for" the type of animus implied by "some racial, or
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus," nor does it
qualify for "such derogatory association with racism. '288 The Court
again cited Maher v. Roe289 and Harris v. McRae,29° this time for the
following proposition: "[W]e have said that 'a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion' is proper and reasonable enough to be imple-
mented by the allocation of public funds.1
2 91
Thus abortion remains constitutional, but the Court is sympathetic
to abortion's opponents. It has approved limitations on public funding
and, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,292 ap-
proved barriers placed in the way of abortion seekers. Here, the Court
refused to allow the protections of § 1985(3) to be applied in the abortion
context. It apparently did all of these based on its "value judgment" that
opposition to abortion is "respectable" and "proper and reasonable." A
change in the Court's personnel could make a difference, but at this mo-
It is also obvious that [defendants'] conduct was motivated "at least in part" by
the invidious belief that individual women are not capable of deciding whether to
terminate a pregnancy, or that they should not be allowed to act on such a decision.
[Defendants'] blanket refusal to allow any women access to an abortion clinic over-
rides the individual class members' choice no matter whether she is the victim of rape
or incest, whether the abortion may be necessary to save her life, or even whether she
is merely seeking advice or information about her options. [Defendants'] conduct is
designed to deny every woman the opportunity to exercise a constitutional right that
only women possess.
Id. at 788. Stevens also commented that defendants' "conduct evidences a belief that it is
better for a woman to die than for the fetus she carries to be aborted." Id at 788 n.21.
284. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
285. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
286. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
287. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 761 (citing Maher, 432 U.S. at 470-71 and Harris, 448 U.S. at 322-
24).
288. Id at 762.
289. 432 U.S. at 472.
290. 448 U.S. at 325.
291. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
292. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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ment, based on this case, the future of the right to abortion appears to be
hanging by a thread.
2. The Carpenters Requirement
The majority in Bray simply cited Carpenters for the proposition
that a § 1985(3) conspiracy must infringe a right that is guaranteed
against private impairment.293 Justice Souter, however, argued that the
drafters had not meant for the section to have such a narrow scope; Jus-
tice Stevens argued that the requirement had been fulfilled because of the
protesters' infringement of the right to travel;294 and Justice O'Connor,
in this as in all aspects of the discussion of the Carpenters-derived re-
quirement, declined to specifically comment.
295
a. Interstate Travel
Although it had previously appeared well settled that abortion clinic
blockades interfered with the right of interstate travel,296 the Court in
Bray reached the opposite conclusion. The majority stated that a pro-
tected right must be consciously "aimed at," not merely incidentally af-
fected.297 Here, the protesters were trying to stop abortion, not travel.
Furthermore, the Court argued that the protesters had not even affected
interstate travel; the only travel prevented was in the immediate vicinity
of the clinics.2 98
Justice Stevens strongly disagreed. He said that the right to inter-
state travel for the purpose of seeking an abortion was clearly constitu-
tionally protected,2 99 and he argued that the majority had misread the
precedents.3°°
The Court's argument that plaintiffs' right to travel was not in-
fringed was not as explicitly value laden as its argument that plaintiffs
were not a protected class. Nevertheless, it could very well be similarly
value driven, designed to justify rejecting what in prior cases had been
plaintiffs' least controversial claim.
b. Right to Abortion
The question of whether interference with the right to abortion
could satisfy the requirement articulated in Carpenters-interference
293. Id. at 762. (citing United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833
(1983)).
294. Id. at 792-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
296. See supra part I.D.
297. Bray, 113 S. Ct. at 762.
298. Id. at 763.
299. Id. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
300. I& at 793-95.
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with a right protected against private infringement-was one of the few
issues that did not provoke an argument: none of the Justices claimed
that it could.301 The majority argued that the right to abortion is not
among those few rights protected against private infringement: "It
would be most peculiar to accord it that preferred position, since it is
much less explicitly protected by the Constitution than, for example, the




Assuming that the Carpenters requirement is valid, then the major-
ity's argument is probably uncontroversial; most constitutional rights are
not protected against private action. But it is noteworthy that the Court
chose to say that the right to abortion is "much less protected by the
Constitution" than are other rights; this is one more piece of evidence
showing how precarious the constitutional right to abortion is at the
moment.
The Court doesn't explain why it believes abortion is less protected
than other rights. In comparing abortion to free speech, the majority
presumably were relying on the fact that free speech is explicitly men-
tioned in the Constitution, while abortion is not. But the majority never
explained why they believe abortion differs from the right to interstate
travel,30 3 neither of which is explicitly mentioned.
B. The Hindrance Clause
An odd feature of the Bray decision is that much of the argument
focused on the question of whether the hindrance clause304 applied, an
issue the majority said was not before the Court.30 5 After asserting that
it could not reach the question, the majority went on to discuss it any-
way, saying that "it would seem" that a claim under the hindrance
301. Justice Stevens, apparently content to rest his arguments on the infringement of inter-
state travel, did not raise the question, not even to expressly decline to consider it. Justices
Souter and O'Connor also failed to reach the issue. The claim had also usually failed in the
prior lower court abortion blockade cases. See supra part I.D.
302. Id. at 764.
303. Although the majority found that the right to travel did not apply to this case, it did
not dispute that the right itself is valid and is protected against private infringement: "There
are few such rights [that are protected against private, as well as official, encroachment]. We
have hitherto recognized only the Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary
servitude, and, in the same Thirteenth Amendment context, the right of interstate travel." Id.
(citations omitted).
304. The hindrance clause covers conspiracies for "the purpose of preventing or hindering
the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons...
the equal protection of the laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1993). See supra part I.B. and part
I.F.4.
305. The majority said that plaintiffs' complaint did not set forth a claim under the clause,
that neither the district nor appellate court considered it, that it was not included in the peti-
tion for certiorari, that the issue was first suggested by questions from the bench during argu-
ment, and that the Court had declined to accept the hindrance clause section of plaintiffs'
supplemental brief on reargument. Id at 764-65.
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clause, like one under the deprivation clause, requires showing a class-
based, invidiously discriminatory animus and a right protected against
private infringement-showings that the majority had already deter-
mined had not been made.30 6
Justices Souter, Stevens, and O'Connor all believed that the plain-
tiffs did have a claim under the hindrance clause. Neither Justice
O'Connor nor Justice Stevens addressed the majority's contention that
the issue had not been properly raised, but both asserted that plaintiffs
had "unquestionably" established a claim under the second clause.30 7
Justice Souter believed it was "reasonable" for plaintiffs to move to file a
supplemental brief on reargument on the issue.308 Although Souter
voted to grant plaintiffs' motion, he would have been satisfied with the
majority's order if it had meant that the claim was simply being left to be
considered at a later date, for example, on remand.30 9 But he believed
that the Court, by "expressing skepticism" that the clause could be a
basis for relief, began "to close the door," a move he called "unfair to
[plaintiffs] after their request was denied.
'310
Justice Souter appears to be correct. Although the majority's dis-
cussion of the issue is dicta, it is likely to influence the later proceedings
in this case. Worse, it could discourage future abortion blockade cases.
By holding that such cases are not actionable under the deprivation
clause, the only option the Court left for potential § 1985(3) abortion
clinic plaintiffs is to assert a hindrance claim. By casting doubt on the
validity of the claim, the majority appears to be trying to deny that op-
tion as well, thus assuring that § 1985(3) will be unavailable altogether
for abortion clinic plaintiffs.
Conclusion
Even if legislation is enacted that will provide increased federal law
enforcement protection for abortion clinics and their patients, there may
still be negative repercussions from the Bray decision. The Court repeat-
edly emphasized that abortion is disfavored and that opposition to abor-
tion is reasonable, thus continuing its trend toward casting doubt on
whether the constitutional right to abortion will continue to be upheld.
The Court also continued its trend toward construing civil rights
laws narrowly. It passed up an opportunity to extend the protection of
§ 1985(3) to women or other non-racial groups whose constitutional
rights are infringed, and it refused to apply the statute to the abortion
blockade situation, even though the dissenters argued strongly that it
306. &d at 765-67.
307. Id. at 795 (Stevens, J., dissenting) and 804 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 770-71 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
309. Id at 771.
310. Id
942
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clearly should apply. The Court was similarly ungenerous in its con-
struction of constitutional law; it provided what is perhaps the narrowest
interpretation yet of the right to interstate travel, and it affirmed the con-
tinuing validity of the doctrine asserted in Geduldig v. Aiello, that preg-
nancy discrimination does not need to be treated as sex discrimination
for Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection purposes.
Any of these could be relied on as a precedent to continue narrow-
ing statutory and constitutional rights. Much depends, however, on the
future composition of the Court. Justice White was a member of the
Bray majority; with his retirement, only four of the Bray majority Jus-
tices remain. A new Justice (or, eventually, new Justices) could cause the
balance to tip and start a much needed reversal of the Court's current
trends.

